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IS THERE HIGH GROUND IN THE MIDDLE
OF THE ROAD? A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
HONORABLE FRITZ W. ALEXANDER II
On January 29, 1985, the New York State Senate unanimously
confirmed the appointment of the Honorable Fritz W. Alexander
II to the New York State Court of Appeals.' Judge Alexander be-
came the first African-American jurist selected to serve a full four-
teen-year term on the court of appeals.2 In April of 1992, in a move
1 See Senate Confirms Judge Alexander, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1985, at B2. See generally
Isabel Wilkerson, Two Court Appointees from Different Backgrounds, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 3,
1985, at B6. Fritz Winfred Alexander II was born on April 24, 1926, in Apopka, Florida and
raised in Gary, Indiana. Id. During World War II, he served as a quartermaster, 2d class,
in the United States Navy. Id. Following the War, he enrolled at Dartmouth College and
after his graduation in 1947, he received his L.L.B. from New York University School of
Law. Id.; AMERICAN BENCH 1582 (Marie T. Hough et al. eds., 6th ed. 1991-92). In 1952,
Judge Alexander was admitted to the bar in New York, and began his career as an attorney
in private practice in New York City. Id.; Wilkerson, supra at B6. In 1957, he, along with
David M. Dinkins and Thomas Benjamin Dyett, founded the firm of Dyett, Alexander &
Dinkins. Id. After several years of private practice, serving a largely black clientele, he
.moved into the judicial and political mainstream with successive appointments to New
York City judgeships.' rd.
After serving as a judge for both the Civil Court and Family Court, Judge Alexander was
appointed as a Supreme Court Justice in 1976. See Alexander Confirmed for Appeals Court,
UPI, Jan. 29, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Alexander
Confirmed]. In 1982, he became an associate justice of the Appellate Division for the First
Department in Manhattan. Id. On January 2, 1985, Governor Mario Cuomo nominated
Judge Alexander to fill the seat on the New York Court of Appeals that had been vacated
upon the retirement of Judge Hugh R. Jones. Id. When nominated, the New York State Bar
Association found him to be "well-qualified," a term the 14 member Committee on Judicial
Selection reserved for candidates found to possess "pre-eminent qualifications." See Senate
Confirms Judge Alexander, supra, at B2; N.Y. State Bar Association Rates Nominees, PR
Newswire, Dec. 21, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File.
Additionally, Judge Alexander, a respected community leader, served as president of the
Harlem Lawyers Association, and helped found a black lawyer's group known as the Na-
tional Bar Association and 100 Black Men, Inc. See Wilkerson, supra at B6. He also served
as a member of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, and was an adjunct
Professor of Law at Cornell University Law School in 1974. See State of New York Letter to
Governor Cuomo, PR Newswire, Dec. 3, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR New-
swire file.
2 Alexander Stille & Amy Tarr, New York Appointments, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 2;
Alexander Confirmed, supra note 1. Harold Stevens had been appointed to the court in
1974, but only to fill a vacancy for one year. Id.
At the time of Judge Alexander's appointment he told the Senate Judiciary committee: "I
would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the symbolic significance of my elevation to the
Court of Appeals." See Senate Confirms Judge Alexander, supra note 1, at B2. Judge Alex-
ander stated that he hoped he could serve as an inspiration, especially to "the minority
youth who so desperately need to be made to feel that there is a real future for them."
Alexander Confirmed, supra note 1. While he expressed hope that his appointment would
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which surprised many of his colleagues, 3 and while at the "pinna-
cle" of his judicial career,4 Judge Alexander resigned from the
inspire "black kids to do something other than stand on the corner," Judge Alexander was
nonetheless emphatic that he had not been nominated "because [he] was black but rather
because [he] was a good judicial choice." See Wilkerson, supra note 1, at B6. "The fact that I
am black is an accident of birth. I am here to serve the people of the state as a judge of this
court." Id.
Judge Alexander believed in a strong minority presence in the judiciary and some years
earlier, accused the Koch administration of being "[1]ess than vigorous" in their appoint-
ment of other black justices to the various state courts. See E.R. Shipp, Black Judges Criti-
cize Koch on Court Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1983, at Al, 33. He "question[ed] whether
there was one standard for white candidates and another for blacks." Id.
In 1981, while attending a black-tie gala at New York University Law School, then New
York State Supreme Court Justice Alexander commented on the gathering of black judges:
"In many respects we have achieved success in our field, but outside our courtrooms we are
looked upon and treated without regard to that achievement." See E.R. Shipp, 'Family
Party" is Staged at N.Y.U.; For the Black Judges in New York, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1981,
§ 1, at 55. "Blacks really haven't made it in this country, and I don't think we should suc-
cumb to the illusion of inclusion." Id.
The reaction of community leaders to his appointment was generally positive. See Alex-
ander Confirmed, supra note 1. New York State Senator Leon Boques of Manhattan, down-
played the racial aspect of the nomination and stated: "Those of us who know Judge Alex-
ander gleam with pride for this is a person who was clearly appointed primarily because of
his qualifications and not because of his ethnicity." Id. Senator Ohrenstein, also of Manhat-
tan, took a different view and stated: "[Tihe fact that Judge Alexander happens to be a
black man should not be ignored but should be praised." Id. Presiding Justice of the Appel-
late Division, First Department, Justice Francis T. Murphy stated: "Fritz Alexander repre-
sents that unique kind ofjudge. He is scholarly and humane, just and merciful." Jon Flem-
ing, Regional News, UPI, Jan. 2, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
In 1985, when Judge Alexander was presented the prestigious Golda Meir Memorial
Award by the Jewish Lawyers Guild, Justice Murphy again spoke and stated: "You, Fritz
Alexander, rise from a people who have long suffered social injustices so total, varied and
profound that they are beyond the imagination of any person in this room. Yet, like Golda,
you were not broken by adversity. Like Golda, you stood and fought." See David W. Dunlap
& Sara Rimer, New York Day by Day; Honoring Judge Alexander, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1985,
at B3.
Judge Alexander's position did not insulate him from experiencing the inequities of prej-
udice. See Chambers of Black Judge Defaced During Break-In, N.Y. TiwEs, Jan. 18, 1981,
§ 1, at 27. In 1981, while on the bench of the Supreme Court, New York County, his cham-
bers on the seventeenth floor of the Criminal Courts Building at One Hundred Centre
Street were ransacked. Id. The intruders scrawled the letters "KKIK" on his office wall. Id.
Although it was true that other chambers were also broken into and several pieces of office
equipment were stolen, Judge Alexander's chambers was the only one defaced in this man-
ner. Id.
3 See Maurice Carroll et al., Dinkins Scores with Fire Dept., NEWSDAY (New York), June
12, 1992, at 20. Albany politicians were puzzled by Fritz Alexander's decision to leave the
Court of Appeals for a position as deputy mayor. "Chief Judge Sol Wachtler (who under-
standably has a high regard for the court he heads) mused during his speech at last week's
Legislative Correspondents Association: 'If he [Judge Alexander] follows the trajectory, his
next job will be school crossing guard.'" Id.
4 Interview with Fritz W. Alexander II, Deputy Mayor for Public Safety, in New York,
N.Y. (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Alexander Interview].
I served the judiciary for twenty-two years, having reached the pinnacle there was no
place else I could go in terms of the judiciary. I was not interested in going to Washing-
ton even if there had been the remote chance that I could have gone to the Supreme
Court, which there was not. In terms of deciding if I wanted to do that for the rest of
my working life, I kept coming up with questions, which for me said: "Think about
something else." I had been interested in Mayor Dinkin's administration from the very
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bench. He accepted the post of Deputy Mayor for Public Safety in
the administration of his long time friend, David M. Dinkins, the
Mayor of the City of New York.5
Although considered a "centrist,"6 Judge Alexander authored
several opinions during his seven years on the Court of Appeals,7
which suggest a decidedly more liberal and expansive philosophy
in cases involving protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. This
Note reviews and analyzes several of his majority and dissenting
opinions to ascertain the impact of Judge Alexander's jurispru-
dence upon the laws of the State of New York. Part One discusses
several significant majority opinions which affect the rights of the
mentally ill; the jury selection process; the press's right to main-
tain confidential sources; and the right of a business person to be
free from unreasonable government searches. Part Two examines
two dissenting opinions which reflect a desire to protect individu-
als in the face of governmental restrictions; specifically, the rights
of civil servants to choose where they will live and the protection
of marital privacy.
beginning... so when an opportunity came to join the administration, I left the Court
of Appeals, coming to the city and an uncertain future... to a whole different lifestyle.
But I enjoy it.... I was satisfied that I was doing something that was appropriate to
do.
Id.
5 See Kevin Flynn, Dinkins' Inaugural Party Mix, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 27, 1989,
at 8 (Mayor Dinkins formally sworn in by friend and former law partner, Judge Fritz Alex-
ander); Daniel Wise, No Drastic Shift Seen with New Judge: Alexander, Smith Views Com-
pared, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at S2 (Special Supplement) (Judge Alexander voluntarily
resigned from Court of Appeals position to become Deputy Mayor for Public Safety).
6 See Kevin Sack, Alexander's Departure Leaves Cuomo Tricky Task of Picking a New
Judge, N.Y. TuMEs, Feb. 9, 1992, § 1, at 36 ("[Judge Alexander] has been a centrist swing
vote on a bench that has been inching toward the right."); see also Daniel Wise, Wachtler
Court: Centrist, Pragmatic, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (noting that despite its cen-
trist, pragmatic posture, Wachtler Court blazed new trails in cases involving individual
liberties); Daniel Wise, Study Finds Court of Appeals Becoming More Conservative,
N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1991, at 1, col. 1 (analyzing voting trends on Court of Appeals and noting
recent retrenchment in treatment of state constitutional rights); Wise, supra note 4, at S2
(analyzing Judge Alexander's general "middle-of-the-road" outlook).
7 Alexander Interview, supra note 4. According to Judge Alexander:
Generally, the rule in the court is that the Chief Judge would put on three by five cards
the title of each of the six or seven cases argued that day and you would draw in order
of seniority, and a rotating seniority, so that if I drew first today, I would draw last the
next day. And the case you drew was the case you were responsible to report on. If your
report to affirm, modify, or reverse garnered three other votes then that became the
majority for the court and you would be the author of the opinion. If you failed to
garner the court, then you had the option of either joining the court or writing a dis-
sent .... Now it might happen that one judge had a yen for a case, and if the judge who
drew the case didn't have any particular feeling about it he might pass it on.
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I. THE MAJORITY OPINIONS
A. Expanding the Rights of the Involuntarily Committed
In 1978 and 1979, two federal district courts 8 recognized that an
involuntarily hospitalized mental patient had a qualified constitu-
tional right to refuse9  antipsychotic medication. 10  These
decisions" prompted involuntarily hospitalized mental patients
throughout the country to secure that right in state courts.' 2 In
Rivers v. Katz,'" the New York Court of Appeals, considered
whether and under what circumstances the State could forcibly
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill patient who was
involuntarily committed to a state facility.' 4 Relying solely on
8 See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), re-
manded, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) "[A]ntipsychotic drugs may be constitutionally
administered to an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient whenever, in the exercise
of professional judgment, such action is necessary to prevent patient from hurting himself
or others." Id.; Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-63 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding medical
patient presumed competent to make decisions regarding treatment in non-emergencies
and could only be forced to take medication in emergency situations), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
9 See Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Law and Pol-
icy, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 339, 355 (1987). In federal court, the constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment espoused in Rennie and Rogers meant that 'a competent and non-dan-
gerous mental patient in a non-emergency situation could prevent the hospital from impos-
ing medications on him." Id. The patient, not the hospital doctors, had the final say. Id.
Today, as a result of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), a patient has the right to
have his medication program reviewed, but the hospital doctors make the ultimate deci-
sion. Id. In other words, today the patient has nothing more than a right to object or to
obtain a second opinion. Id.
10 See Brooks, supra note 9, at 341-42. The New Jersey District Court in Rennie relied on
the right to privacy, and the Massachusetts District Court based its decision on the First
Amendment right to freedom of thought and communication. Id. Both courts, however,
qualified the right to refuse medication in situations "where ... the refusing patient was
either dangerous to himself or to others in the hospital or was not capable of making a
rational treatment decision." Id. at 354-55.
11 See Steven Mintz, Note, The Nightmare of Forcible Medication: The New York Court of
Appeals Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitution, 53 BROOK. L.
REv. 885, 887-91 (1987) (discussing background federal case law).
12 See Brooks, supra note 9, at 343 n.14 (listing state court cases brought by mentally ill
patients to obtain right to refuse medication). See generally Sol Wachtler, The Patient's
Right to Decline Medical Treatment: The New York View, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
9, 9 (1991) (discussing evolving case law in New York State concerning patients' right to
decline medical treatment in different situations).
13 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
14 Rivers involved three individuals who were involuntarily committed to Harlem Valley
Psychiatric Center and retained pursuant to court order. Id. at 490-92, 495 N.E.2d at 339-
40, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76-78. Prior to the entry of their respective retention orders, each pa-
tient refused to be medicated with various antipsychotic drugs. Id. Each individual sought
review pursuant to [1986] 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 27.8, which provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Review of Objection. Prior to initiating a treatment procedure over the objection of a
patient, such objection must be reviewed by the head of the service. The decision of the
head of the service shall be communicated to the patient and his or her representative,
if any, and to the Mental Health Information Service, and treatment may be initiated
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New York's common-law precedents,' 5 Judge Alexander concluded
that involuntarily committed mental patients had a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause of the New York State Consti-
tution1 6 to refuse antipsychotic medication.' 7 Judge Alexander ex-
plained that absent compelling state interests,' before the admin-
istration of drugs pursuant to the state's parens patriae power, 19 a
judicial determination would be required to establish whether the
patient possessed the requisite capacity to make a reasoned deci-
unless the patient or her or his representative chooses to appeal this decision to the
director, each patient's objections were considered, but ultimately overruled.
Id. at 490 n.2, 495 N.E.2d at 339 n.2, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77 n.2. Thereafter, two of the individ-
uals commenced declaratory judgment actions to enjoin the "nonconsensual administration
of these drugs," and to "obtain a declaration of their common-law and constitutional right
to refuse medication," and the third commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking identical
relief. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The New York Supreme Court,
Special Term, denied relief to all three individuals on the ground that "the involuntary
retention orders necessarily determined that these patients were so impaired by their
mental illness that they were unable to competently make a choice in respect to their treat-
ment." Id. The Appellate Division consolidated the three appeals and affirmed, and plain-
tiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
15 See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492-93, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78; see also In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 372, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (patient's right to
refuse treatment guaranteed by common law as well as constitution), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981); Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(every individual "of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body"); Vincent M. Bonventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A
Non-Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 31, 55 (1989) ("[C]ourt relied
exclusively on its common-law precedents to invalidate state regulations which authorized
the forcible anti-psychotic medication of involuntarily committed mental patients, regard-
less of their capacity to make decisions and regardless of the absence of any danger from
non-medication".).
16 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." Id.
17 Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492,495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. See generally Samuel
J. Brakel, J.D. & John M. Davis, M.D., Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental Pa-
tients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429, 437-72 (1991) (discussing
benefits and risks of drug treatment and harms resulting from no treatment and inability
of involuntarily committed to make decisions regarding their treatment); Brooks, supra
note 9, at 344-52 (analyzing harms and benefits of antipsychotic medication); Mary C. Mc-
Carron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the Mentally
Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 477, 477 (1990)
("Within the psychiatric profession the use of these drugs to treat psychotic patients re-
mains controversial as psychiatrists debate the benefits and long term risks of antip-
sychotic drug administration.").
18 See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (1986). The State
may be permitted, pursuant to its police power, to administer antipsychotic medication
over a patient's objections "[wihere the patient presents a danger to himself or to other
members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the
institution." Id. There was no claim made here that the medication was required for either
of these reasons. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
19 Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 343-44, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81. But see Brakel & Davis, supra
note 17, at 433 ("decision to override a treatment is best made by medical personnel rather
than judges or other legal functionaries").
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sion 2° with respect to the proposed treatment. Judge Alexander
believed that:
[i]n our system of a free government, where notions of individ-
ual autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individ-
ual who must have the final say in respect to decisions re-
garding his medical treatment in order to insure that the
greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy and
freedom from unwanted interference with the furtherance of
his own desires. This right extends equally to mentally ill per-
sons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or
dignity because of their illness.2 '
This decision recognized the fundamental right of the involunta-
rily institutionalized mentally ill to refuse treatment, 22 invali-
dated the existing administrative regulations,23 and implemented
additional due process safeguards.24
20 See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498 n.7, 495 N.E.2d at 344 n.7, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81 n.7. The
court noted that the following factors should be considered in evaluating a patient's ability
to consent or refuse treatment:
1) the person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; 2) the patient's ability to un-
derstand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; 3) the patient's
cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; 4) the absence of any interfering
pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the decision; 5) the ab-
sence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe manic depression, euphoria or
emotional disability; 6) the absence of any interfering pathologic motivational pres-
sure; 7) the absence of any interfering pathologic relationship, such as the conviction of
helpless dependency on another person; 8) an awareness of how others view the deci-
sion, the general social attitude toward the choices and an understanding of his reason
for deviating from that attitude if he does.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69
N.C. L. REv. 945, 948-62 (1991) (identifying criteria competency standards must meet).
21 Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
22 See Mintz, supra note 11, at 899 ("[11n deciding that involuntary commitment does not
equal incapacity to determine the course of treatment, the court extended the fundamental
right to refuse treatment to the institutionalized mentally ill.").
23 Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (administrative re-
view procedures of [1986] 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 27.8 "do not sufficiently protect due process
rights of involuntarily committed patients guaranteed by Article I, § 6 of the New York
State Constitution"); see also supra note 14 (providing administrative procedure pursuant
to [1986] 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 27.8(c)).
Judge Alexander found the administrative procedures inadequate because they failed to
'articulate the standards to be followed or criteria to be considered at each stage of the
administrative process, i.e., what the need is for the particular drug, whether a particular
drug is the least intrusive, whether it is capable of producing the least serious side effects,
and the proper length of its use." Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497-498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 81.
24 Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The determination of
whether the patient is capable of making a competent decision regarding his or her own
treatment
should be made at a hearing following exhaustion of the administrative review proce-
dures provided for in 14 New York Code of Rules and Regulations 27.8. The hearing
should be de novo, and the patient should be afforded representation by counsel (Judi-
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The guidelines established by Judge Alexander in Rivers were
instrumental in safeguarding the due process rights of the invol-
untarily committed mental patients who wish to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs. For instance, in Eleanor R. v. South Oaks Hospi-
tal,25 the Appellate Division for the Second Department applied
the Rivers guidelines 26 before deciding to uphold an order to ad-
minister antipsychotic medication to an involuntarily committed
patient against her will.27 The court considered the testimony of
the hospital's expert witness, a psychiatrist,28 as well as the pa-
tient's direct statements29 before concluding that the hospital
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the patient
was incapable of rendering a decision regarding the proposed
treatment.30
Again, in Adele S. v. Kingsboro Psychiatric Center,31 the Appel-
late Division for the Second Department held that the hospital
had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the pa-
tient lacked the ability to make a reasoned decision with respect
to the proposed hospital treatment.32 In reaching its decision, the
ciary Law § 35[1][a]). The State would bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence the patient's incapacity to make a treatment decision. If, after
duly considering the State's proof, the evidence offered by the patient, and any in-
dependent psychiatric, psychological or medical evidence that the court may choose to
procure (Judiciary Law § 35[4]), the court determines that the patient has the capabil-
ity to make his own treatment decisions, the State shall be precluded from administer-
ing antipsychotic drugs. If, however, the court concludes that the patient lacks the
capacity to determine the course of his own treatment, the court must determine
whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the
patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, includ-
ing the patient's best interests, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the ad-
verse side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive alternative
treatments. The State would bear the burden to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the proposed treatment meets these criteria.
Id.
25 123 A.D.2d 460, 506 N.Y.S.2d 763 (2d Dep't 1986).
26 See supra note 24 (outlining guidelines established by Rivers decision).
27 Eleanor R., 123 A.D.2d at 461, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (patient did not have capacity to
make treatment decision).
28 See id. at 460, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 764. The psychiatrist testified "that the patient had
been diagnosed as suffering from 'schizophrenic paranoia'.., and her illness had destroyed
her ability to make a reasoned decision regarding her treatment which, in his opinion,
called for the proposed antipsychotic medication." Id.
29 Id. at 460, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 763. The patient denied she was mentally ill and in need of
medication. Id. Additionally, she "spoke in a rambling and incoherent manner ... about her
fear of cyanide in the proposed medication and her desire to sue the hospital for malprac-
tice and her husband for fraud." Id. at 460-61, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
30 Id. at 460, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
31 149 A.D.2d 424, 539 N.Y.S.2d 769 (2d Dep't 1989).
32 See id. at 424, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
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court considered both the hospital expert's testimony"3 and the
patient's evaluation statement. 4
Adhering to the Rivers guidelines, the court also concluded that
the proposed medication was narrowly tailored to preserve the pa-
tient's "liberty interest."3 5 The court noted that the medication
would stabilize the patient, improve her daily activities, skills,
and hygiene, as well as combat any potential adverse side effects
such as mild tremors, weight gain, and sleeplessness.3 6 Accord-
ingly, the Appellate Division upheld the lower court's authoriza-
tion to administer the proposed antipsychotic treatment pursuant
to the state's parens patriae power.3 7
While in both Eleanor R. and Adele S. involuntarily committed
mental patients were forced to take medication against their will,
as a result of the Rivers decision, their objections were not disre-
garded. Judge Alexander's opinion, in Rivers, helps to ensure that
involuntarily committed persons who are prescribed antipsychotic
medication will receive additional due process protection.
In addition to expanding the rights of involuntarily committed
mentally ill patients in New York State, Judge Alexander also en-
deavored to preserve racial equality in the New York jury selec-
tion process.
B. Equal Protection in Jury Selection
In Batson v. Kentucky,38 the United States Supreme Court reaf-
33 Id. at 424-25, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 770. The witness testified that the patient had been
diagnosed as a "chronic paranoid schizophrenic." Id.
34 Id. at 425, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 770. "[T]he patient's evaluation statement confirms the
expert's testimony that the appellant has denied that she requires medication and main-
tains a delusional belief that her condition is improving." Id.




38 476 U.S. 79 (1986). "Petitioner, a black man, was indicted . .. [for] second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods." Id. at 82. At the inception of petitioner's trial, a voir
dire examination of the venire was conducted by the judge who excused certain jurors for
cause, following which the parties were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges. Id. at
82-83. The prosecutor, using his peremptory challenges, excused all four black persons on
the venire, leaving a jury composed of only white persons. Id. Defense counsel moved to
discharge the jury on the ground that the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges
violated petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 83. The Court con-
cluded, however, after considering Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.38, that per-
emptory challenges may be used to strike anybody. Id. at 83.
Petitioner was convicted on both counts, and thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court
of Kentucky. Id. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction, noting its prior
reliance on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), and its previous holding that a "defend-
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firmed the principle espoused in Swain v. Alabama 9 that a
"[sitate's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause."40 The Batson Court, however,
rejected the evidentiary standard outlined in Swain and estab-
lished a new procedure to prove an equal protection claim arising
from the petit jury selection process. 4' Furthermore, the Batson
Court never discussed whether its holding would apply to the de-
fense's use of peremptory challenges,4 2 or what factors would be
considered in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation had been made. 43 Judge Alexander, writing for a unani-
mous court, answered these questions in two recent cases.44
ant alleging lack of a fair cross section must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of
jurors from the venire." Id. at 84. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id.
39 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
40 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84. The Batson Court stated:
Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right
to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended
to secure. "The very idea of a jury is a body.., composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors,
fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds."
Id. at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
Additionally, purposeful exclusion in jury selection on account of race unconstitutionally
discriminates against the excluded juror and affects the entire community by undermining
"public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87.
41 See Steven W. Fisher, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A 'Batson Update',
N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1; see also Lisa A. Stancati, The Survey of New York
Practice: Defense Barred Under New York State Constitution From Racially Discriminating
Through Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 595, 606 n.3 (1991) (dis-
cussing defendant's difficulty in proving systematic discrimination under Swain and
change in standard under Batson which lightened defendant's burden).
Under Batson, the defendant has the burden of proving purposeful discrimination just as
in any other equal protection case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. However, the defendant may
now do so relying solely on evidence surrounding his own trial. Id. at 96. To establish prima
facie discrimination, the defendant must show that "he is a member of a cognizable racial
group," that peremptory challenges were used by the prosecution to exclude members of the
defendant's race, and that the relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecu-
tor discriminated in selection of the petit jury on account of race. Id. Thereafter, the prose-
cution must provide racially neutral reasons for its jury selection choices. Id. at 97.
42 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12 ("We express no views on whether the Constitution im-
poses any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel.").
43 See Fisher, supra note 41, at 1. Batson left open other questions including: 1) "whether
it would prohibit a prosecutor from systematically excluding jurors belonging to a racial
group other than the defendant's, . . . [and] 2) what would constitute an acceptable race-
neutral explanation for a disputed peremptory challenge." Id.
44 See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 77 (1990); People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10
(1990); see also Fisher, supra note 41, at 1. "Regardless of how the Supreme Court ulti-
mately resolves the federal constitutional question, the law in New York is now settled. In
this state a defendant may not exclude jurors solely on the basis of race and constitutional
limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges apply equally to the prosecution and
the defense." Id.
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In People v. Kern,45 Judge Alexander rejected the defendants'
contended right to use peremptory challenges to prevent individu-
als of a specific race from serving on the criminal jury and rea-
soned "that such racial discrimination has no place in our court-
rooms and that such conduct by defense counsel is prohibited by
both the Civil Rights Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
our State Constitution."
46
45 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 643, 554 N.E.2d at 1236-37, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49. Defendants
were convicted of manslaughter and other charges as a result of their participation in an
attack upon three black men who sought assistance in the Howard Beach neighborhood
after their car broke down. Id.
On December 20, 1986, the night of the attack, the defendants, and approximately 27
other teenagers, were attending a birthday party in Howard Beach. Id. at 643, 554 N.E.2d
at 1237, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 649. Several of the teenagers, upon leaving the party to drive
someone home, encountered three black men in the neighborhood and a confrontation en-
sued. Id. The teenagers thereafter returned to the party and one of the defendants,
shouted, "[tihere were some niggers on the boulevard, let's go up there and kill them." Id. at
644, 554 N.E.2d at 1237, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
The defendants, armed with bats and sticks, left the party and tracked the victims down.
Id. A fight ensued causing the victims to run in separate directions. Id. One victim man-
aged to escape. Id. One was caught and repeatedly assaulted while his assailants chanted,
"Niggers, get... out of the neighborhood." Id. Eventually, the second victim broke free and
was joined by the third victim. Id. at 644-45, 554 N.E.2d at 1237, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
These two victims continued to be chased by the teenagers, on foot and then by car. Id. at
645, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 650. Eventually, the teenagers pulled ahead of
the two victims. Id. With nowhere else to go, one of the victims jumped over the three-foot-
high guardrail of the Belt Parkway, ran across the three eastbound lanes, jumped the me-
dian and ran into the westbound lanes where he was struck by a vehicle and killed. Id.
Eventually, someone called the police. Id. The body was identified and the assaulted victim
was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries. Id. at 646, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 650.
46 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 642-43, 554 N.E.2d at 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648; see N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 11. This section of the State Constitution provides: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, be-
cause of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state." Id.
On the first day of jury selection, defense counsel challenged three-out-of-four black ju-
rors for cause, but only one successfully, and thereafter peremptorily challenged the re-
maining three. See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 647, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651. Before
exercising these peremptory challenges, however, defense counsel applied for eight more
challenges because they felt black jurors were volunteering to serve and did not want to be
excused whereas white jurors were using any excuse to get off. Id. At that point, the prose-
cution argued that defense counsel's use of its peremptory challenges constituted a prima
facie case of discrimination and requested that they provide race neutral reasons for their
decisions, but the court felt the application was premature and denied the motion. Id. By
the close of the third day, defense counsel challenged six black jurors on the panel for
cause, but only one was granted. Id. The prosecution renewed its motion, but decision was
reserved. Id. The following day, the New York State Supreme Court ruled that Batson
applied to defense counsel and required defense counsel, prospectively, to provide race neu-
tral explanations for any further peremptory challenges used. Id. Defense counsel thereaf-
ter provided race neutral explanations for six of the seven black jurors peremptorily chal-
lenged. Id. In the end, one juror was excused with no explanation, three were successfully
peremptorily challenged, and the remaining three were excused for different reasons. Id. at
647-48, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
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While recognizing the historical importance of peremptory chal-
lenges in the criminal trial process,47 Judge Alexander concluded
that they were not of a "constitutional dimension."48 He also noted
that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion already restricted the prosecution's use of peremptory chal-
lenges,49 and concluded that such limitations must also be applied
to defense counsel pursuant to the New York State Constitution. °
Clearly, Judge Alexander and the Court of Appeals refused to con-
done purposeful racial discrimination shielded by the facade of
peremptory challenges.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Alexander shifted his focus
from the rights of the criminal defendant to the rights of the po-
tentially excluded juror and society in general.5 Although the de-
fendants asserted that the Civil Rights Clause of the New York
State Constitution5 2 was inapplicable in this case because per-
emptory challenges were not prohibited statutorily, Judge Alexan-
der rejected the defendants' narrow interpretation of the New
York State Constitution.53 He noted that:
Jury service, by contrast, is a civil right established by Consti-
tution and statute,5 4 . . . [and] [flor racial discrimination to
result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified
47 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 647, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
48 Id. at 648, 554 N.E.2d at 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 652. "Today the right derives from
CPL 270.25, which defines a peremptory challenge as 'an objection to a prospective juror for
which no reason need be assigned' and sets the number of peremptory challenges for both
the prosecution and the defense in accordance with the seriousness of the crimes charged."
Id. at 649, 554 N.E.2d at 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
49 Id., 75 N.Y.2d at 649, 554 N.E.2d at 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (noting equal protec-
tion restrictions imposed by United States Constitution and New York State Constitution).
50 Id. at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 647; see Sidney Stein, Defense and
Prosecution Challenges, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 3. "Unlike Batson, however, which was
founded on the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, the Court of Ap-
peals' ruling was anchored in the civil rights and equal protection clauses of the New York
State Constitution." Id.
51 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654. "Racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of juries harms the excluded juror by denying this opportunity to par-
ticipate in the administration of justice, and it harms society by impairing the integrity of
the criminal trial process." Id.
52 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11.
53 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. "This argument,
however, reduces our constitutional Civil Rights Clause to a mere redundancy; in defend-
ants' view, the clause would operate to prohibit private discrimination only where such
discrimination was already expressly prohibited by statute." Id.
64 Id., 75 N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. Judge Alexander rec-
ognized that in addition to being a constitutionally established privilege, petit jury selec-
tion was expressly proclaimed a civil right under N.Y. CmvL RicHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney
1992). Id. at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws en-
acted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a demo-
cratic society and a representative government.5 5
Judge Alexander made it clear that racial discrimination would
not be tolerated either in the selection of the venire or in the petit
jury selection process.56 He stated that "this opportunity for ser-
vice on a petit jury is a privilege of citizenship which may not be
denied our citizens solely on the basis of their race."57
In People v. Jenkins,58 Judge Alexander concluded that the
prosecution's "pattern of strikes" against potential black jurors
constituted a prima facie case of discrimination.59 The Court of
55 Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. Judge Alexander also noted Civil
Rights Law § 13 and the Legislature's deliberate assertion to make petit jury selection a
civil right. Id. at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. "The statute leaves no
doubt that service on the petit jury is a civil right in this State, and this being so, it is the
Civil Rights Clause of article I, § 11 of the Constitution which limits the defense exercise of
its peremptories." Id.
58 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990). Alexander Jenkins and Ronald
Johnson were charged with "two counts of attempted murder of a police officer, robbery in
the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon" following an armed
robbery of a Bronx supermarket and a subsequent shootout involving pursuing police of-
ficers. Id. at 553, 554 N.E.2d at 48, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 11. Both of them were black. Id.
Forty-seven prospective jurors were examined for the ensuing trial; ten were black and
thirty-seven were white and latino. Id. Of the ten peremptory challenges exercised by the
prosecutor, "seven... were used to remove seven of the ten blacks on the panel while only
three were used against the white and latino group." Id. Defense counsel challenged two of
the three remaining black jurors because they each had a connection to law enforcement
and the final jury consisted of the remaining black juror and eleven whites. Id. at 554, 554
N.E.2d at 48, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the one black juror was not
truly representative of the 50% black population in the Bronx and that the prosecutor knew
defense counsel would dismiss the two black jurors connected to law enforcement thereby
accomplishing his strategy to permit a "token number of blacks to remain on the panel
unchallenged in order to avoid a charge of systematic exclusion." Id. at 554, 554 N.E.2d at
48-49, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. The trial court denied defense counsel's mistrial motion,
concluded there was no systematic exclusion of black jurors, and declined the prosecutor's
offer to explain her challenges. Id. After being convicted, for second degree robbery, defend-
ant appealed. Id. The Appellate Division reversed his conviction and granted him a new
trial on the ground that "a pattern of strikes against blacks evincing a discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges had been established." Id. at 554-55, 554 N.E.2d at 49, 555 N.Y.S.2d
at 12. On appeal, the People argued that "inasmuch as the prosecutor did not exclude all
blacks from the jury defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination
under Batson, 476 U.S. 79. (1986)." Id. at 555, 554 N.E.2d at 49, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
59 Id., 75 N.Y.2d at 556, 554 N.E.2d at 50, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 13. Out of the 10 peremptory
challenges used by the prosecution, seven were used to strike potentially suitable black
jurors from the venire. Id. The remaining three were used against 37 non-black potential
jurors. Id. "These circumstances were sufficient to establish a 'pattern of strikes' against
black prospective jurors based 'solely on account of their race or on the assumption that
black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a
black defendant.'" Id. (quoting People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 1211,
522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97 (1987) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986))).
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Appeals rejected the prosecutor's assertion that no discrimination
was exercised in the jury selection process because the percentage
of blacks unchallenged by the prosecutor and remaining on the
jury closely reflected the percentage of the black population in the
Bronx at the time of the trial.6 0 Judge Alexander wrote:
A Batson violation is not avoided... simply because notwith-
standing the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the
prosecutor leaves some blacks on the jury panel and those left
are enough to form a petit jury containing a percentage of
blacks not significantly lower than the percentage of blacks in
the local community.6
His rationale again was anchored in the equal protection rights
of all potential jurors and protection of the entire criminal justice
system.62 According to Judge Alexander:
No argument based on percentages of the population would
remove from these excluded prospective jurors the sense of ex-
clusion resulting from being assumed to be incompetent to sit
on a jury solely because of their race. Further, this type of
discrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness
of our system of justice and is repugnant to the just operation
of a free society.63
These opinions are significant not only because they answered
questions left unresolved by the United States Supreme Court,
but also because they proclaimed New York's intolerance for racial
discrimination.
C. The Scope of the New York Press Shield Law
Due process and equal protection are not the only areas of con-
stitutional law in which Judge Alexander's decisions have been
catalysts for change. In Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Greenberg,4 Judge Alexander discussed the scope of the First
60 Id. at 557, 554 N.E.2d at 50, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 13. Judge Alexander recognized that the
prosecution did not challenge the remaining two potential black jurors because they knew
that defense counsel would because of their law enforcement connections. Id.61 Id. at 557, 554 N.E.2d at 50-51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 13-14.
62 Id. at 557, 554 N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14. "The exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges against prospective jurors solely because of race discriminates unconstitutionally
against the excluded juror." Id. Furthermore, "[slelection procedures that purposefully ex-
cluded black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
ofjustice." Id. at 558, 554 N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14.63 Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d at 558, 554 N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
64 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
19931
544 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:531
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press and the exact na-
ture of the protection afforded to reporters and their sources
under the New York Press Shield Law ("Shield Law"). 65
In February of 1986, Donald Bent of Watervliet, New York, was
interviewed by John McLoughlin, a reporter for WTEN-TV Al-
bany, concerning the disappearance of his wife. 6 The interview
subsequently ignited a bitter debate in the New York Court of Ap-
peals regarding the proper scope of the Shield Law.6 7 The issue
65 Id. at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596; see N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-
h(8Xb) (McKinney 1992). The statute provides: "No professional journalist .. . shall be
adjudged in contempt by any court... for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the
source of any news coming into such person's possession in the course of gathering or ob-
taining news for publication." Id.
66 Id. at 153-54, 511 N.E.2d 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d 596. Donald Bent was interviewed by
WTEN-TV in Albany, New York, regarding the disappearance of his wife, Joan Bent, whom
he had reported to the authorities as missing. Id. Ten days later, on February 27, 1986, the
body of Joan Bent was discovered in the trunk of her car behind her place of employment.
Id. See Man Charged in Wife's Death, UPI, Apr. 30, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, UPI File. An autopsy established that she had been strangled. See Regional News:
Albany, New York UPI, Mar. 14, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
In April of 1987, Bent was charged with the murder; see Bent Found Guilty of Murder,
UPI, May 4, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. During the trial, testimony
demonstrated that there was trouble in the Bent's marriage. Id. Apparently, Bent stran-
gled his wife after learning that she had been seeing another man and was planning to seek
a divorce. Id. An Albany County jury convicted him of second degree murder on May 2,
1988. Id.
67 See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAw § 79-h(8Xb) (McKinney 1992); see supra note 65. The New
York Press Shield Law, as it is commonly known, applies only to a newsperson's defense to
government subpoenas for information as part of a criminal investigation, all other intru-
sions fall under the First Amendment and New York State Constitution provisions. See
Richard Rosen, Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York's Narrow Interpreta-
tion of the Newperson's Privilege; Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 54
BRooK. L. REV. 285, 288 n.18 (1988) (citing O'Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., 71
N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988)).
After reporters from the television station owned by Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc.,
interviewed Bent, approximately one minute of the tape they had shot aired on the six
o'clock news. See Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at
596. When Donald Bent later became a suspect in his wife's murder, the District Attorney,
Sol Greenberg, began a grand jury investigation. Id. WTEN was served with a subpoena
duces tecum, which sought all of the videotapes and reporters' notes taken in connection
with the interview, Id. Although the station handed over the broadcast portion of the inter-
view, they refused to give the District Attorney's office copies of the outtakes and notes
from the interview conducted by their reporter. Id.; see also Domestic News: Albany, UPI,
Mar. 14, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (WTEN claimed outtakes were
confidential under Shield Law and First Amendment).
At a hearing before State Supreme Court Justice Lawrence Kahn on March 13, 1986,
Timothy Dyke, the attorney for Knight-Ridder, claimed that the New York Shield Law
afforded an "absolute privilege" to the interview notes. Id. Assistant District Attorney,
George Banner, said the New York protection was not as wide as the station believed it to
be. Id.
Judge Kahn ruled for the television station, stating that the intent of the Shield Law was
to "jealously guard the independence and freedom of the news media." See Domestic News:
Albany, New York, UPI, Mar. 27, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The
Appellate Division disagreed, holding that the Shield Law did not extend to information
that had not been received under a promise of confidentiality remanding the matter for an
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before the court in Knight-Ridder was whether the protection
under the Shield Law applied solely to confidential sources, or if
the statute provided an unqualified and absolute privilege against
compelled disclosure regardless of the nature of the source.6"
Writing for the majority,69 Judge Alexander stated that al-
though the Shield Law was enacted to protect the newsgathering
and dissemination process, 70 the scope of the privilege was not ab-
solute.71 He found support for his position in decisions by the Ap-
pellate Divisions of each judicial department of New York, which
had all consistently applied a confidentiality prerequisite.72 Judge
Alexander found it particularly persuasive that in 1981 the New
York Legislature failed to adopt language to discredit this judicial
interpretation.73 In spite of a vigorous dissent by Judge Bel-
in camera inspection on the issue of confidentiality. See Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154,
511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596; see also Jon Fleming, Appeals Court Decides
Shield Law Protects Only Confidential Sources, UPI, July 31, 1986, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that court ordered WTEN to release tape of interview).
After the New York Court of Appeals dismissed one appeal taken as of right, the Appellate
Division granted leave to appeal on a certified question. See Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at
514 n.2,511 N.E.2d at 1117 n.2, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596 n.2. The Court of Appeals, in a four-to-
three decision, limited the scope of the privilege to confidential sources. Id. at 159-60, 511
N.E.2d at 1120-21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600.
68 See Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154 n.2, 511 N.E.2d at 1117 n.2, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596
n.2. The Appellate Division certified the question: "Did this court err in reversing the
Supreme Court's order and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court for an in-camera
[sic] inspection of the taped interview with Donald Bent to determine what portions, if any,
of such interview were conducted confidentially?" Id. The issue before the Court of Appeals
was: "Whether the New York Press Shield Law (Civil Rights Law § 79(h)) extends its pro-
tection to non-confidential sources or information obtained in the course of gathering or
obtaining news for publication." Id. at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
Michael Hoblock Jr., the attorney for the station-owner, Knight-Ridder Broadcasting,
Inc., stated: "This case raises directly, for the first time, the question of what the shield law
covers - just confidential material, or all material regardless of the source, confidential or
otherwise.' See Fleming, supra note 67.
69 See id. at 168, 511 N.E.2d at 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
70 Id., 70 N.Y.2d at 155, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (strong desire to safe-
guard channels of communication).
71 Id. at 155-56, 511 N.E.2d at 1117-18, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97 (entire thrust of Shield
Law is to shield communications given to news media in confidence).
72 Id. at 155, 511 N.E.2d at 1118, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citing People v. LeGrand, 67
AD.2d 466,415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1979)); In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1973); People v. Dan, 41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't
1973); People v. Wolf, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1st Dep't 1972).
73 Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 156-58, 511 N.E.2d at 1119-20, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99.
Judge Alexander began his discussion of the proposed 1981 amendments by acknowledging
that their purpose was to "amend the statute to strengthen its protection for newspersons."
Id. at 156, 511 N.E.2d at 1118, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (footnote omitted). However, he pointed
out that there were other proposed amendments in that same year, and while those were
all included in the approved bill, the "proposal seeking to eliminate the confidentiality re-
quirement ... was deleted from the version of the bill that was ultimately approved.' Id.
Judge Alexander reasoned that this legislative action had been taken with knowledge of
the consistent application by the courts of a confidentiality requirement. Id. at 157, 511
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lacosa, v4 the court agreed that the conclusion that the Shield Law
was applicable only to confidential sources or information was
inescapable.75
Harsh criticism of the statutory interpretation employed in
Knight-Ridder was almost immediate. 76 However, the criticism
N.E.2d at 1119, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 598. "It is well settled that the legislative history of a
particular enactment must be reviewed in light of the existing decisional law which the
Legislature is presumed to be familiar with and to the extent that it left it unchanged, that
it accepted." Id. The failure to act on the part of the Legislature must be viewed as "indica-
tive that legislative intent has been correctly ascertained." Id.
The majority also dismissed the station's First Amendment claim of privilege on the
grounds that the qualified privilege did not protect the taped interview since it contained
information relevant and necessary to the grand jury and the information was unavailable
elsewhere. Id. at 160, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
74 Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1125, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (major-
ity never addressed, nor quoted the language of the statute).
Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa argued that the majority violated a "threshold statutory con-
struction rule" since the plain meaning of the statute was never addressed. Id. Instead, the
majority proceeded directly to an interpretation of legislative intent. Id. An interpretation
which he believed completely ignored prior precedent. Id. at 161, 511 N.E.2d at 1121-22,
518 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01. Judge Bellacosa stated:
Indeed the majority opinion cannot disguise what it effects by "interpretation", "judi-
cial construction," and "legislative intent." They functionally enact their own amend-
ment to the core provision of the Shield Law by striking the word "any" and substitut-
ing the word "some" so that the protection is now only afforded to "some news" rather
than "any news," as the Legislature enacted it and as the Governor signed it into law
.... The majority's holding produces classic irony. New York State's judiciary, which
should be the bastion of protection of this right.., instead chills that right by inserting
its own confidentiality clause into an unqualfied statute. Their holding may be reduced
to this syllogism: (1) the lower courts put confidentiality into the statute; (2) the judici-
ary then says the legislature did not take it out; and (3) the judiciary finally declares
that the Legislature put it in in the first place.
Id.; see also Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 251, 465 N.E.2d 304, 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765,
771 (1984). "The inescapable conclusion is that the Shield Law provides a broad protection
to journalists without any qualifying language." Id. But see Oak Beach Inn v. Babylon Bea-
con, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 165, 464 N.E.2d 967, 970, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272, cert. denied, 105 U.S.
907 (1984). "However, the Legislature has never established an absolute right or granted
journalists complete immunity from all legal consequences of refusing to disclose evidence
relating to a news source." Id.
Judge Bellacosa argued that stare decisis demanded that the language in Shanley
"should have been persuasive in deciding this case." Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 165, 511
N.E.2d at 1124, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 603. He found it "astonishing" that both of these cases,
which he and the other dissenters considered to be so squarely on point, would be "rele-
gated to a denigrating end-piece footnote in the majority opinion." Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at
1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
Judge Bellacosa echoed Shanley and argued that the Shield Law provides a broad protec-
tion to journalists without qualification. Id. at 166, 511 N.E.2d at 1125, 518 N.Y.S.2d at
604. Judge Bellacosa expressed the concern that the position taken by the majority would
serve to "transmogrify newspeople into agents of the government ..... Id. at 168, 511
N.E.2d at 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
75 Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 158, 511 N.E.2d at 1120, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 599 ("considera-
tion of all the circumstances . . . leads inexorably to the conclusion" that privilege is not
absolute).
76 See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Const,, 71 N.Y.2d 521, 533, 523 N.E.2d 277, 283, 528 N.Y.S.2d
1, 7 (1988) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) ("cramped statutory construction"); see also Rosen,
supra note 67, at 288. "[Tlhe Court of Appeals overlooked controlling precedent and incor-
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was not universal as law enforcement officials viewed the decision
as a victory.77 Nevertheless, Governor Mario Cuomo and others
vigorously lobbied for a legislative amendment to settle the is-
sue.7 The amendment, adopted in 1990, provided a two-tier privi-
lege to the press: an unqualified privilege for confidential sources
and a qualified privilege for information gathered without a prom-
ise of confidentiality.7 9
Judge Alexander recognized that a balance needed to be struck
rectly determined the legislative will." Id.; Shelley R. Halber, Note, Knight-Ridder Broad-
casting v. Greenberg: Is the Judiciary Making Policy?, 8 PACE L. REv. 427, 469 (1988) (rely-
ing on failure to amend statute is misinterpretation of legislative history); A Shield
Needlessly Dented, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1987, § 4, at 28 (nowhere in statute is confidential-
ity stated or implied); Jonathan Ferziger, New York Court: TV Station Must Yield Tapes,
UPI, July 7, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (WTEN not protected due to
lack of promise of confidentiality).
Bruce Sanford, attorney for the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, was
quoted as saying: "What is unfortunate about this decision is that it jeopardizes the tradi-
tional neutrality of the news media." Id. The State Assemblyman who had been responsible
for the 1981 amendments, Steven Sanders, a Democrat from Manhattan, called the major-
ity position: 'The most tortured, twisted logic I have ever seen." See E.R. Shipp, Reporters'
Rights: Altered Interpretation of New York's Law, N.Y. TumEs, July 11, 1987, § 1, at 35.
Sanders, like Judge Bellacosa, was of the opinion that the statute was not "even subject to
interpretation. All you have to do is read it." Id.
Judge Alexander in the majority opinion, although not referring to Mr. Sanders by name,
stated: "The views of one legislator ... are not necessarily revealing of the legislative in-
tent." See Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 159, 511 N.E.2d at 1120, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (cita-
tions ommitted). Judge Alexander felt that by refusing to amend the statute so as to pre-
clude the continued imposition of a confidentiality requirement by the courts, the
Legislature had simply not accepted the sponsor's recommendation. Id.
Only a few short days after the decision in Knight-Ridder, Sanders was already vowing
more amendments. See Shipp, supra, at 35. "I'll draft legislation that even a second-grader
can read and understand.. . ." Id.
77 See Shipp, supra note 76, at 35 (court's ruling victory for law enforcement officials).
78 See Jonathan Ferziger, Regional News: Albany, N.Y, June 21, 1988, UPI, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (bill drafted by Cuomo's office as result of Court of Appeals'
decision); Shield Bill Advances, N.Y. TuEs, Mar. 21, 1989, § B, at 2 (Assembly approved
measure 134 to 4); Sam Howe Verhovek, Proposed Law Would Protect Press in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1989, § B, at 1 (news organization pushing to strengthen law since 1987).
79 See N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAw § 79-h(b)(c) (McKinney 1992); see also People v. Lyons, 151
Misc. 2d 718, 574 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Buffalo City Ct. 1991). In Lyons, a Buffalo television sta-
tion moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum which requested videotape shot during a sting
operation by the Buffalo Police Department at an escort service. Id. at 719, 574 N.Y.S.2d at
127. It was one of the first cases to interpret the Shield Law after the 1990 amendments.
Id. at 721, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The court found that the statute, taken together with the
1990 amendments, indicated that it was the intention of the Legislature to "strengthen the
independence of the press" and to expand the privilege "to include unpublished non-confi-
dential news information as well as unpublished confidential new information." Id. at 723,
574 N.Y.S.2d at 130. The result of the new amendments in Lyons was that a waiver of
confidentiality by the source of the news did not automatically result in the information
becoming "wholly unprotected and subject to disclosure." Id. Rather, the People could only
obtain disclosure if they were able to "make a clear and specific" showing of each element of
the three prong test now contained in the New York Shield Law, e.g., that the news is
"highly material and relevant; is critical or necessary to the maintenance of the People's
claim, defense or proof of a material issue; and not obtainable from any alternative source."
Id. (citing N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1992)).
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between the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and
the government's legitimate interest in obtaining crucial informa-
tion unavailable elsewhere. In Knight-Ridder, Judge Alexander
presumed the legislature had "debated the efficacy of granting
broad protection to the press, weighted competing policy consider-
ations, and reached a formulation that in its view serves the best
interest of the public." ° Judge Alexander believed that his
opinion reflected this balance." While in light of the subsequent
amendment it is easy to be critical of Judge Alexander's position,
it must be noted that these were not the words of a lone dissenting
judge, but rather the opinion of the majority of the court.
D. Warrantless Searches
As was the case in Knight-Ridder, judges are often called upon
to balance competing interests in order to render a decision com-
patible with public policy considerations. Judge Alexander's deci-
sion in People v. Burger, 2 balanced law enforcement's need to
80 Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 155, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.YS.2d 595, 596 (1987).
81 Id. at 155, 511 N.E.2d at 1117-18, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97 (court should not substitute
its view for that of Legislature).
82 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
Defendant, Joseph Burger, was the owner of a Brooklyn junkyard involved in the disman-
tling of automobiles. Id. at 340, 493 N.E.2d at 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 702. On November 17,
1982, five plain-clothes officers of the New York City Police Department entered his yard
and inquired of the defendant whether he had a valid license as required by New York law
to operate the junkyard and to dismantle automobiles. Id., at 338, 493 N.E.2d at 926-27,
502 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03. Whereupon Mr. Burger informed the officers that he did not keep a
'police book," which recorded the vehicle identification numbers of all the vehicles and
parts on the premises, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a). Id. The officers
then conducted a warrantless inspection pursuant to the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 415-a, which provided, that all records "and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which
are subject to the record keeping requirements of this section which are on the premises"
must be produced for inspection upon demand. Id. at 340 n.2, 493 N.E.2d at 927 n.2, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 703 n.2. During the ensuing inspection, the police uncovered two vehicles that
had been reported stolen; along with personal property that reportedly had been in one of
the vehicles. Id. at 341, 493 N.E.2d at 927, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 703. Mr. Burger was charged
with criminal possession of stolen property. Id.
Defendant filed a motion for an order of suppression which was denied on April 12, 1984.
See People v. Burger, 125 Misc. 2d 709, 709, 479 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1984). However, on April 30, 1984, the Appellate Division decided People v. Pace, 101
A.D.2d 336, 475 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1984). In Pace, the police officers stopped a truck which was
carrying a large section of an automobile, which, upon inspection, was found to have no
VIN numbers. Id. at 337, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 444. The officers learned that the drivers had
picked up the chassis at Economy Auto Salvage. Id. When the police officers arrived at the
junkyard, they were told that the police book had been stolen in a burglary. Id. The court
found that the "officers undertook to survey the yard, not for the purpose of an administra-
tive inspection but expressly to gather evidence of a crime." Id. at 338, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
All physical evidence obtained as a reult of the search was suppressed because the focus of
the search had shifted from an administrative inspection to a criminal investigation. Id. at
340-41, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47.
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gather information in order to successfully prosecute those guilty
of crimes, and the constitutionally protected right of an individual
to be free from unwarranted government intrusion. 3 In Burger,
the New York Court of Appeals determined that two New York
statutes, 4 which permitted the warrantless searches of automo-
bile junkyards and certain businesses storing discarded or second-
hand merchandise,8 5 were unconstitutional.8 8
Judge Alexander, writing for a unanimous court, held the two
New York statutes "facially unconstitutional." v He found the
statutes fundamentally defective because they permitted searches
to be undertaken "solely to uncover evidence of criminality and
not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme." 8 The primary
purpose of these statutes was to afford police a more efficient
Burger requested a rehearing in light of Pace. See Burger, 125 Misc. 2d at 709, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 937. The request was granted. Id. Upon rehearing, Justice Lewis L. Douglas,
Jr., held that the search in Burger was valid since the junkyard industry was pervasively
regulated and the statute was properly limited in time, place, and scope. Id. at 710-15, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 938-940. Justice Douglas found this case to be "materially" different from the
situation in Pace. Id. at 713, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 939-40. These officers were not hunting for
evidence of a crime, but rather, were "actually conducting an administrative inspection
when they showed up at defendant's place of business." Id. at 713-14, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed. See People v. Burger, 112 A.D.2d
1046, 493 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2d Dep't 1985). See generally Abraham Abramovsky, Criminal Pro-
cedure, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 227, 238-40 (1987) (statutes originally deemed part of compre-
hensive regulatory scheme).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. IV., which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
84 Burger, 67 N.Y.2d at 340, 493 N.E.2d at 966, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 702. The two statutes
challenged were Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a), which allowed vehicle dismantling
businesses to be inspected without a warrant, and New York City Charter § 436, which
allowed junkyards and businesses storing second-hand merchandise to be searched without
a warrant. Id. While the Fourth Amendment has been found to extend to commercial prem-
ises, a warrantless search will nonetheless be permitted in those industries that are "per-
vasively regulated" and under such circumstances that "the search itself is part of a regula-
tory scheme designed to further an urgent state interest." Id. at 343, 493 N.E.2d at 928,
502 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
85 Id. at 343-45, 493 N.E.2d at 928-30, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 704-06 (statutes unconstitutional
as violation of Fourth Amendment).
86 Id., 67 N.Y.2d at 345, 493 N.E.2d at 930, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 706 ("facially un-
consitutional").
87 Id., 67 N.Y.2d at 345, 493 N.E.2d at 930, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
88 Id. at 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705. A warrantless search will be per-
mitted in those industries that are "pervasively regulated" providing that "the search itself
[is] part of the regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent state interest." Id. at 343,
493 N.E.2d at 928, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 704. The ability to conduct warrantless inspections
must be essential to the effectuation of an administrative scheme. Id. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). And the inspection must be authorized by a valid statute that is care-
fully limited in time, place, and scope. Id. (citations omitted).
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means of dealing with those who traffic in stolen goods.89 Judge
Alexander reasoned that the defendant's admission to the police
officers that he did not have the "police book"90 he was required to
keep, rendered the subsequent search of the premises an improper
administrative inspection. 9' The search was "undertaken solely to
determine whether the defendant was storing stolen property on
his premises,"92 and was accordingly, a violation of the owner's
constitutional rights.93
On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals' ruling.94 Justice Harry Blackmun explained
that the searches were constitutional because they fell within the
exemption for "closely regulated" businesses.95 These industries
have a history of governmental oversight which renders an expec-
tation of privacy unreasonable.96 The Court found that exemption
to be justified by the state's substantial interest in combating the
recent explosion in the incidence of car theft.9 7
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the New York Court
89 67 N.Y.S.2d 338, 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 926, 705 (1986) ("expedient
means of enforcing penal sanctions for the possession of stolen property"), rev'd 482 U.S.
691 (1987). The situation faced by the court in Pace, was whether the search was under-
taken solely to gather evidence of a crime which the police already had reason to believe
had occurred. See Burger, 67 N.Y.2d at 343, 493 N.E.2d at 928, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 704. In
Burger, Judge Alexander found the constitutional inquiry to be proper because the facts
presented the precisely the "type of search contemplated by the statutes." Id.
The court found that neither statute did more than authorize general searches of com-
mercial premises. Id. In fact, since the junkyard search provision of the New York City
Charter contained no record keeping requirements it would be impossible for the police to
argue that they were determining compliance with any regulatory scheme. Id.
90 Id. at 341 n.1, 493 N.E.2d at 927 n.1, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 703 n.1 ("police book," required
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a), is record of all vehicles and parts in possession
of dismantler).
91 Id. at 343, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (inspection must be 'essential" to
administrative scheme).
92 Id. at 345, 493 N.E.2d at 930, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 706. The People concluded in their brief
that the "immediate purpose of investigating [the junkyard was] to determine [if defend-
ant's] inventory include[d] stolen property." Id.
93 Id.
94 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 718 (1987).
95 Id. at 703-04.
96 Id. at 700 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)).
97 Id. at 708-12 (car theft has become significant social concern). The Supreme Court
stated that a "pervasively regulated business" may be inspected without a warrant so long
as three criteria are first met. Id. at 702. First, the inspection must be made pursuant to a
'substantial government interest." Id. Second, the inspection must be "necessary to further
[the] regulatory scheme." Id. And third, the statute's inspection program must provide the
owner of the business an adequate substitute for a warrant, by advising the owner that the
search will be made pursuant to the law and by limiting the discretion of the officers in-
specting the premises. Id. at 703. But since the court found the search constitutional under
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5), they did not address the constitutionality of section 436
of the New York City Charter. Id. at 703 n.13.
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of Appeals for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion."9 However, the case was dismissed on the People's mo-
tion on November 12, 1987 when it was determined that the "de-
fendant [was not] ... presently available to obey the mandate of
the Court in the event of an affirmance." 99
As a result of the disappearance of the defendant in Burger, the
New York Court of Appeals did not have an opportunity to re-
spond to the United States Supreme Court opinion until 1992,
when it decided People v. Keta.100
In Keta, Judge Alexander joined in the opinion written by Judge
Titone' 01 in which Judge Titone stated: "States have the power to
interpret provisions of their State constitutions as providing
greater protections than their federal counterparts."1 °2 The court
found that statutory provisions, like the one in Burger, which per-
mit warrantless searches of vehicle dismantaling businesses,
must be part of a pervasive administrative program unrelated to
enforcement of the criminal laws in order to be valid under the
New York State Constitution. 10 3 Judge Titone's opinion is strongly
reminiscent of Judge Alexander's in Burger, wherein he stated
that "an administrative search must serve an administrative pur-
pose; when designed instead to uncover evidence of a crime the
traditional requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply."1
0 4
II. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
While Judge Alexander was not a frequent dissenter, 10 5 he was
willing to do so when he felt it was warranted. 0 6 The following
98 Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 718.
99 People v. Burger, 70 N.Y.2d 828, 828, 518 N.E.2d 1, 2, 523 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (1987).
100 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
101 Id. at 523, 593 N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
102 Id. at 496, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (citations omitted).
103 Id. at 499, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
104 People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 343, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705
(1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
105 See Wise, supra note 5, at S2, S3. In seven years on the Court of Appeals, Alexander
wrote 108 majority opinions, 4 concurrences, and 18 dissents. Id.
106 Alexander Interview, supra note 4. When asked about the decision to dissent, Judge
Alexander had these comments:
One of the things that Chief Judge Wachtler sought to achieve was consensus. As the
articulator of the common law it is well to speak with a single voice. But no one would
interfere with the right of a member of the court to articulate a contrary view. To
dissent is your right. And to express your opinion is your duty. The court was con-
stantly confronted with policy considerations and the court makes policy to a signifi-
cant degree. I never felt any pressure [to conform]. We had some very heated argu-
ments to be sure. Reasonable minds can differ.
1993]
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examples require the application of lofty constitutional principles
to somewhat prosaic concerns of everyday life.
A. Residency Requirements for State Employees
On April 3, 1989, the United States Supreme Court denied certi-
orari and declined, without comment, to hear an appeal in Winkler
v. Spinnato.10 7 In Winkler, a group of firefighters challenged the
constitutionality of New York's public employee residency stat-
ute.'08 The firefighters sought to convince the Supreme Court'0 9
to adopt the arguments set forth in Judge Alexander's lone
dissent." 0
In Winkler, the Court of Appeals held that since firemen had no
fundamental right to be employed as firemen,"' the State only
needed to establish that it had a legitimate interest in requiring
the firemen to reside within state boundaries." 2 Based on pre-
Id.
107 72 N.Y.2d 402, 530 N.E.2d 835, 534 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005
(1989).
108 Id. at 402, 530 N.E.2d at 836, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 128. The firefighters in Winkler chal-
lenged the constitutionality of N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 3(19), 30 (McKinney 1988) relying on
both the New York and Federal Constitutions. Id. at 404-05, 530 N.E.2d at 836, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 128-29. The amendments at issue were "passed as a form of amnesty" to a
statute, enacted in 1829, but which had never been strictly enforced. Id. at 405, 530 N.E.2d
at 836-37, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 129. In 1986, the Fire Department of the City of New York
ordered that all firefighters who resided outside New York State had to move into to one of
certain designated counties within New York State within one year of the effective date. Id.
However, those officers who already resided within the state could remain where they
were, but if they did subsequently move, it would have to be to one of the designated coun-
ties. Id.; see David L. Gregory, Labor Relations Law, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 463, 492-92
(1989) ("limited residency requirements can be imposed by local government employers
throughout the state"); Maurice Carroll, Out-of-State Firefighters Lose Bid, NEwsDAY (New
York), Apr. 4, 1989, at 6 (Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari allows New York to
constitutionally draw distinctions between in-state and out-of-state residents); Arnold H.
Lubasch, Firefighters Lose Challenge to New York Residence Act, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1989,
at B3 (Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari with regard to statute requiring New
York City firefighters to move to city or adjacent counties if they want to keep job).
109 Winkler, 72 N.Y.2d at 405, 530 N.E.2d at 836, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 129 (New York may
constitutionally draw distinction between those who violate only local residency require-
ment and those who violate both local and state requirements). See generally Court Uphold
Residency Regulations for New York City Safety Employees, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1288, at 1584, (Nov. 7, 1988) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File.
110 See Winkler, 72 N.Y.2d at 408-09, 530 N.E.2d at 838-39, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31 (Al-
exander, J., dissenting) (New York may not constitutionally confer benefit upon in-state
residents solely on basis of domicile on date of amendments).
111 Id. at 406, 530 N.E.2d at 836, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 129. "Plaintiffs have no fundamental
right within purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to be employed as New York
City firefighters." Id.
112 See id. at 406, 530 N.E.2d at 837, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30. The court found that since
plaintiffs could not be considered a suspect class, the amendments at issue would be upheld
if it was determined that the State had a legitimate interest upon which to base them. Id.
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sumptions of loyalty and economic gain to the State, the court held
the interest in the instant matter was legitimate 113 and the resi-
dency regulations were rationally related to that interest.1 4
In his dissent, Judge Alexander agreed that a legitimate state
interest could be served by requiring firefighters and other gov-
ernment employees live within the state." 5 However, he did not
agree that the State's interests were rationally served by requir-
ing those employees to live within designated counties in the
state. 116 Judge Alexander acknowledged that local county inter-
ests could possibly be served by requiring firefighters to reside
within a particular county; but if such was the case, then a regula-
tion that allowed some firefighters to escape the requirement did
not rationally serve that interest." 7 Judge Alexander took a prag-
matic approach and considered the economic realities of life in
New York City and the immediately adjacent counties and the im-
pact thereof on the individual firefighter and his family. 1 8 He
found that the amendment would confer a palpable benefit on
those firefighters who already lived within the state by allowing
them to remain in the less expensive suburbs and rural counties,
while mandating that those moving in from out-of-state had to re-
side in the more expensive New York City boroughs and six neigh-
113 See id. (employees who reside in-state spend more locally, pay state and local taxes,
and tend to exhibit loyalty to state).
114 Id. The distinction between those who were already New York residents and those
who were forced to move in from out-of-state was a subordination of the State's local inter-
est in an attempt to "accommodate those in violation." Id. at 407, 530 N.E.2d at 838, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 130. The court felt that "[tihis limited accommodation to those who already
satisfied the state residency requirement, and therefore, (did] not have to move for that
purpose, [was] rational and [did] not violate equal protection." Id.
115 Winkler, 72 N.Y.2d at 408, 530 N.E.2d at 838, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting) (State has legitimate interest in requiring its public officers to be state
residents).
116 Id. (state interest not rationally served by requirement that firefighters live in a par-
ticular county).
117 Id. (local interest not rationally served by imposing local requirement on only some
New York City firefighters).
Judge Alexander felt that "the challenged amendments would be constitutional if they
required all New York City firefighters to move into the State or if they required all New
York City firefighters to move into a lawful county." Id. However, neither interest was
"rationally served by requiring only the out-of-state firefighters to move into the lawful
counties." Id.
118 Id., at 408, 530 N.E.2d at 838, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 131; see N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw §§ 3(19),
30(5-a) (McKinney 1988). The local residency requirements require that all New York City
Public Officers reside in one of the five boroughs of the City of New York: Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens, or Staten Island; or into one of six adjoining counties: Nassau, Suffolk,
Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, or Orange. Id.; see also Lubasch, supra note 108, at B3
(residency requirement established over a century ago).
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boring counties. 1 9 Judge Alexander opined that this was clearly
unconstitutional in effect since the State conferred an economic
benefit upon some residents based solely on established state resi-
dency at a previous point in time. 120
B. Marital Privacy Rights, Conjugal Visits, and AIDS
Judge Alexander authored another a dissent in Doe v. Cough-
lin.'21 In Coughlin, a state prisoner infected with Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") and his wife challenged the
authority of prison officials to prevent them from continued partic-
ipation in a conjugal visit program. 122
The plurality in Coughlin,123 responded to the constitutional
challenges of the petitioners by holding that "the limitations of
119 See Winkler, 72 N.Y.2d at 408-09, 530 N.E.2d at 838-39, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 131. Judge
Alexander did not find a legitimate state interest in the resulting conferral of economic
benefit in the form of more affordable housing upon those who were in-state residents at
the time the amendment was passed. Id. For support of his position, Judge Alexander re-
lied on the Supreme Court decisions which held that "a State [could not] constitutionally
confer a benefit upon some state residents and not others solely on the basis of established
State residency at a past point in time." Id. (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63-64
(1982)).
120 Id. at 409, 530 N.E.2d at 839, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 131. Judge Alexander found that the
result of enforcement of the amendments would be to confer an economic benefit of de-
creased cost of living on in-state firefighters, "solely because they were state residents on
the date that the amendments became effective." Id. Judge Alexander viewed such a result
a violation of the Federal and State Constitutions. Id.
121 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879
(1988).
122 Id. at 48, 518 N.E.2d at 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 782. Petitioner was an unidentified
prison inmate serving a term of five and one-half to eleven years for an undisclosed crime
at the Auburn Correctional Facility. Id. at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 783. He
was married while in prison on June 6, 1985. Id. In October 1985, as part of the prison's
Family Reunion Program, petitioner and his wife qualified for a two-day conjugal visit to be
held in a private trailer on the prison grounds. Id. The stated purpose of this program is to
"preserve, enhance and strengthen family ties that have been disrupted as a result of incar-
ceration." Id. at 51, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (citing [1987] 7 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 220.1).
In December of 1985, the prisoner was diagnosed as having Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) and all subsequent requests for continued participation in the program
were denied. Id. Prison authorities stated that the denial was proper under the provisions
of (1987] 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 220.3[a-c], which provide that a diagnosis of infection with a com-
municable disease was grounds for disqualification. Id. at 56 n.1, 518 N.E.2d at 541 n.1,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 787 n.1.
In challenging the disqualification, petitioners alleged violation of three constitutionally
protected rights: the fundamental right to marital privacy; due process; and equal protec-
tion." Id. at 52, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785 ("[clonstitutional right to privacy
involves the broad, general right to make decisions concerning oneself ... free of govern-
ment restraint or interference.") (citations omitted).
123 See Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 75, 518 N.E.2d at 554, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 800; see also Jef-
frey Schmalz, New York Court Upholds Conjugal-Visit Ban for Inmate with AIDS, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 25, 1987, at Bl (court sharply divided).
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prison life require that an inmate forfeit his right to marital inti-
macy."124 The court noted that although the prisoner had previ-
ously been permitted to participate in the Family Reunion Pro-
gram, it did not create a protected liberty interest in continued
participation in the program. 125 Finally, the court concluded that
the petitioners' equal protection claim failed because equal protec-
tion did not require absolute equality, 126 but only that a classifica-
tion 127 which resulted in unequal treatment must have a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 1 28 The court found the
Prison Commissioner's determination that AIDS was a communi-
cable disease that could spread to non-prisoners as a result of the
Family Reunion Program was not a violation of the petitioners'
equal protection rights because it was rationally related to the le-
gitimate state purpose of preventing the further spread of AIDS, a
124 See Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The court
recognized that "[an individual does not automatically forfeit all constitutional rights upon
conviction of a crime." Id. at 53, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785. But as a general
rule, he will only retain rights which are consistent with the "penological objections of the
corrections system." Id. at 53, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86 (citations omit-
ted). Continuation of intimate marital relations have traditionally been viewed as inconsis-
tent with the goals of removing the prisoner from society as a form of punishment. Id. at
53-54, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786. Therefore, the "State is under no obligation
to establish conjugal visitation programs." Id. at 54, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786
(citations omitted). But see Thomas M. Bates, Note, Rethinking Conjugal Visitation in
Light of the "AIDS" Crisis, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 121, 140-45
(1989) (arguing for more conjugal visitation programs as means of preventing AIDS in
prison).
125 Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 55 n.1, 518 N.E.2d at 541 n.1, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787 n.1. The
regulatory scheme behind the Family Reunion Program provided for the consideration and
balancing of fifteen individual guidelines and "many of these entail consideration of subjec-
tive factors." Id. The court found that "the guidelines do not create an entitlement of conju-
gal visits because the review system is highly discretionary and hold out no more than the
possibility of conjugal visits." Id. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The pro-
gram did not create a legitimate expectation of a benefit because inmates had to reapply
each time they sought a visit and each application was subject to a separate de novo discre-
tionary review. Id.
126 Id., 71 N.Y.2d at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
127 Id. at 57 n.2, 518 N.E.2d at 542 n.2, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788 n.2 (issue is broader than
inmates with HIV or AIDS, and included all inmates diagnosed with communicable
diseases).
128 Id. Chief Judge Wachtler, in his concurrence, stated that while he may have agreed
with the result of the majority opinion, he believed that since the decision of the Commis-
sioner was based on the fact that if left alone "a married couple would engage in sexual
relations," the decision encroached upon marital privacy and thus raised constitutional
concerns requiring a higher level of scrutiny. Id. at 62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
791 (Wachtler, J, concurring). He nevertheless believed that even at this higher level of
scrutiny "the Commissioner's decision ha[d] a sufficient basis." Id. Since the statute, Cor-
rection Law § 70(2)(a), required the Commissioner to act with "the safety and security of
the community" in mind, this action by protecting a prison visitor from "being exposed to a
concededly fatal infectious disease was proper." Id.
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deadly disease for which there is no known cure.12 9
Writing for the dissent, Judge Alexander argued that the Com-
missioner's decision "invade[d] an area of personal decision mak-
ing between a married couple embraced by their marital privacy
right."130 If the husband were not incarcerated, the government
would clearly be prohibited from forbidding the couple to engage
in sexual relations absent a "compelling government purpose and
the most narrowly tailored means to achieve that purpose."' 3'
Judge Alexander reasoned that the court was therefore being
asked to determine the effect of incarceration on the petitioner's
rights. 132
Judge Alexander acknowledged that prisoners have no per se
rights to conjugal visits, 133 but argued that merely because enroll-
ment in the Family Reunion Program was not mandated under
the New York State Constitution, it did not follow that the Com-
missioner "may condition petitioner husband's eligibility in any
way he sees fit."1 34 He argued that the Commissioner's decision
was impermissible because it was based upon sexual conduct,
which may or may not occur between a husband and wife during
the conjugal visit.1 35 Judge Alexander believed it was clearly an
issue of marital privacy.' 36
Judge Alexander further contended that the level of scrutiny ap-
plied to the statute by the majority was incorrect. 1 37 Since the fun-
129 Id. at 57, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788. The court found that the likelihood
that "safe sexual practices" could reduce the risk of infection did not render this decision
any less rational. Id. at 58, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
130 71 N.Y.2d 48, 63, 518 N.E.2d 536, 546, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 792 (1987) (Alexander, J.,
dissenting). "Certainly, the decision of a married couple to risk the consequences of sexual
intercourse (such as pregnancy, abortion, and infection) falls within the scope of... mat-
ters of marriage that are constitutionally protected." Id. at 64, 518 N.E.2d at 546, 523
N.Y.S.2d at 792.
131 Id. at 64, 518 N.E.2d at 546-47, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 66, 518 N.E.2d at 548, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 794. Judge Alexander noted that such
rights are not created simply because the Commissioner has determined, in his expertise
as an administrator, that the establishment of a Family Reunion Program is "consistent
with institutional administration and security, and with legitimate penological goals." Id.
134 Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 548, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
135 See 71 N.E.2d 48, 67, 518 N.E.2d 536, 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d 787, 795 (1987). "For
although admission to the program is not by itself a right, the decision to engage in or
abstain from sexual relations once admitted to the program implicates an aspect of the
fundamental marital right .... " Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 548, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
136 Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795. "The interest of a married couple in
being permitted to make for themselves the intimate and personal decision, free of govern-
ment intrusion - whether to engage in sexual relations - is fundamental and of recog-
nized constitutional dimension." Id.
137 Id. at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (standard does not compel strict
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damental constitutional right of privacy was clearly impacted by
the regulations at issue, the proper level of scrutiny was not mere
"rational basis" as the plurality maintained, 138 but whether the
regulation furthered a "legitimate institutional or penological pur-
pose."13 9 The only justification for the policy asserted by the Com-
missioner was the danger that the AIDS virus would be trans-
mitted to petitioner's wife.' 4 ° However, Judge Alexander was
convinced that "the asserted interest [was] not a penological
one."' 4 ' Moreover, he argued, even if this were a valid goal, the
deprivation of all access to the Family Reunion Program repre-
sented an "exaggerated response" to petitioner's medical condi-
tion, 42 since existing alternatives to complete banishment from
scrutiny, but it is not satisfied with mere rational basis).
138 Id.
139 Id. The Supreme Court enunciated a four prong test to determine the reasonableness
of those prison regulations that impinge on constitutional rights in Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987):
First, whether there is a valid logical connection between the prison regulation and the
institution's interest put forward to justify it; second, whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; third, whether ac-
commodation of the asserted constitutional right will adversely impact on correction
employees, on the prison population, and on the allocation of prison resources; fourth,
whether there are ready alternatives available to prison authorities to adequately ad-
dress the concerns advanced.
Id. at 89-91.
140 Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 70, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The court was
bound by the statements of the Commissioner and was not permitted to "hypothesize some
penological interest on respondent's behalf." Id.
141 See id. at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The court stated that there
was no impact on the prison community). "Respondent has not shown how its policy bears
any relationship to the the traditional purposes for incarceration, or how it addresses con-
cerns for institutional security and administration." Id. (citation omitted). The main opin-
ion stated that preventing the spread of communicable diseases to nonprisoners fell within
the Correction Law § 70(2)(a) mandate to establish programs with regard to the "safety and
security of the community." Id. Judge Alexander disagreed and stated that since the Legis-
lature had not delegated to the Department of Corrections the "authority to regulate mat-
ters relating to public health," such purpose is not penological so as to warrant the court's
deference to the agency expertise presumably relied upon in making its determination. Id.
at 73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
142 Id. at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 90) (1987). Judge Alexander argued that this action could effect other members of the
family possibly entitled to participate in the program, but who could not, according to the
weight of the medical evidence, be at risk for infection "undermines any purported rational-
ity and highlights the exaggerated nature of [the] response." Id. at 72, 518 N.E.2d at 552,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
In the months immediately following the diagnosis of the husband's illness, the couple
participated in counseling regarding "safe-sex" so there was no reason to believe that Mrs.
Doe's infection with the AIDS virus was a foregone conclusion. Id. at 70, 518 N.E.2d at 550-
51, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 796. Further, Mrs. Doe had been counseled as to the "critical role" her
support would play in her husband's mental health. Id. Judge Alexander saw "obvious,
easy alternatives to respondent's policy that accommodate[d] the substantial interests of
the petitioners while imposing de minimis burdens on respondents' resources." Id. at 72,
518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
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the program were never explored.143
Judge Alexander strongly believed that the Commissioner failed
to prove that the regulations were reasonably related to a legiti-
mate penological purpose.14 4 Therefore, proscribing the prisoner's
participation in the program, based solely on his having AIDS,
was untenable. 145
When asked about the decision of the majority, Judge Alexan-
der replied:
I think the driving force was a consideration of the larger
community. Of course, my view was there was no demon-
strated danger to the large community and it was a presump-
tion to think that the wife would contract AIDS and then go
out and violate her marriage vows. I thought we should have
focused on the rights of the prisoners.
146
CONCLUSION
During his seven years on the New York Court of Appeals, the
Honorable Fritz W. Alexander II had the opportunity to write on a
broad spectrum of topics. Through his opinions he revealed, not a
personal judicial agenda, but a pragmatic dedication to justice on
a case by case basis. Judge Alexander underscored this notion of
impartiality when he stated, "I never tried to categorize myself. I
call them as I see them." 147
Ironically, his decisions show he was both an admirable de-
fender of individual civil rights and a conscientious protector of
the community. Judge Alexander's decisions will undoubtedly in-
fluence the lives of New Yorkers for many years to come. And he
was keenly aware of the potential impact when he explained:
One thing you must bear in mind, the Court of Appeals is the
court of last resort in this State. It is the articulator of the
common law of the State. So that every case decided by that
court is of importance in the sense that it either affirms the
common law, articulates a new rule of law, or interprets a
statute which becomes the law of the State. 14
8
143 Id. at 71-72, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
144 Id.
145 71 N.E.2d 48, 75, 518 N.E.2d 536, 554, 523 N.Y.S.2d 787, 800 (1987).





When Judge Alexander decided to retire from the bench, many
were critical of his choice. They saw it as folly, a step in the wrong
direction. Naturally, he does not agree. Perhaps his new postion
as Deputy Mayor of the City of New York will provide even greater
opportunity to serve the people of New York. But regardless of the
vagaries of the future, he left behind a legacy of service to the
Court of Appeals. Perhaps recently confirmed Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said it best when she told the Senate
Judiciary Committee of the importance of an appoach to judging
that "is neither liberal nor conservative." 49 Justice Ginsburg said:
"A judge sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no
hints. To do so would display disdain for the entire judicial pro-
cess."' 50 Judge Alexander had the utmost respect for the judicial
process and for that reason, for him, the middle of the road was
clearly higher ground.
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